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Abstract
Historic transformations took place in Canada’s refugee 
programs in the 1970s. Through the eyes of Michael Molloy, 
then director of Refugee Policy in the Department of Man-
power and Immigration, this article explores the political 
climate that led to innovations in refugee admissions and 
resettlement efforts as they evolved from subjective, ad hoc 
affairs in the immediate post-war period to integral aspects 
of Canada’s immigration program by the late 1970s. By con-
sidering the role of individual members of the Department 
of Immigration, including the visa officers stationed over-
seas who were responsible for determining admissions and 
immigration officials working in policy units in Ottawa, this 
article points to the important role that individuals played 
in delivering programs that ultimately shaped the direction 
of refugee admissions and resettlement in Canada and the 
country’s engagement with the international refugee regime.
Résumé
Au Canada, les programmes relatifs aux réfugiés ont fait 
l’objet de modifications historiques dans les années 70. À 
travers le regard de Michael Molloy, qui était alors Direc-
teur de la politique relative aux réfugiés au Département de 
la Main d’œuvre et de l’Immigration, cet article détaille le 
climat politique qui a conduit aux innovations concernant 
l’admission des réfugiés et les efforts de réinstallation, alors 
que ce sujet passait du statut d’affaires ponctuelles et sub-
jectives de l’après-guerre immédiat à celui de perspectives 
indissociables du programme d’immigration du Canada à 
la fin des années 70. En envisageant le rôle des membres du 
département de l’immigration, y compris celui des agents 
des visas établis à l’étranger et responsables sur le terrain 
de l’admission des immigrants et celui des agents de l’im-
migration travaillant à Ottawa dans diverses unités de la 
politique, cet article fait apparaître en premier lieu le rôle 
important joué par les personnes dans la délivrance des 
programmes en vertu de la Politique sur les minorités oppri-
mées qui, ultimement, a façonné la direction de l’admission 
des réfugiés et de leur réinstallation au Canada. Il met par 
ailleurs en évidence l’engagement du pays envers le régime 
international des réfugiés. 
Introduction
Since the Second World War, refugee policy in Canada has evolved dramatically from an ad hoc, often disin-terested approach to global displacement to an integral 
part of Canada’s immigration programs. This article pro-
poses that the key period of change occurred in the 1970s. 
Using the recollections of Michael Molloy, former director 
of Refugee Policy in the Department of Manpower and 
Immigration, this article suggests that the reforms that led 
to the development of the formal refugee programs (includ-
ing the under-explored Oppressed Minority Policy), which 
facilitated the admission of refugees beyond the traditional 
focus on Europe, were highly influenced by those doing and 
managing resettlement.
In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on 
the role that so-called brokers have played in the facilitation 
of global migration, historically and presently.1 The focus 
of this scholarship has generally been on how legal and 
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illegal migration relied, and continues to rest, on networks 
of informed friends, family, and entrepreneurs. Increasingly, 
however, scholars are considering the role that individuals 
within the system play in facilitating or discouraging cross-
border migration.2 Building on this approach, this article 
considers the role of civil servants in transforming Canada’s 
refugee policy during the critical decade of the 1970s as 
Canadian politicians and the general public became increas-
ingly attuned to refugee movements globally, responding to 
crises in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia.
Michael Molloy’s career provides a unique vantage point 
from which to consider how a single broker’s experience 
is simultaneously informed by, while itself informing, the 
migration of people across borders. Molloy’s career inter-
sected with key chapters in the evolution of the Canadian 
government’s response to refugees. His career with the 
immigration foreign service began in 1968, the year before 
Canada committed to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 
Protocol. He served as a visa officer in Tokyo, Beirut, and 
Minneapolis, and was director of refugee policy from 1976 to 
1978. His time in the field, as well as a senior manager, coin-
cided with major population upheavals in Africa, Southeast 
Asia, and Latin America, to which the Canadian government 
ultimately responded. When a major refugee movement 
occurred in Southeast Asia in 1979, Molloy coordinated the 
Indochinese Refugee Task Force, overseeing the selection, 
reception, and settlement of 60,000 Indochinese refugees. 
Now that he is president of the Canadian Immigration 
Historical Society, Molloy’s attention has turned to reflect-
ing on and documenting Canada’s past engagement with 
immigration and refugee issues. This has involved facilitat-
ing the preservation of historic documents such as those of 
the Ugandan Asian refugees of 1972 as well as the organiza-
tion of workshops on the history of refugees in Canada.3 This 
article emerges from Molloy’s interest in documenting the 
events and initiatives that influenced the transition from a 
reactive, ad hoc approach to refugees to a formal, law-based 
refugee policy informed as much by experience as principle. 
Working in collaboration with Laura Madokoro, a historian 
interested in refugee policy and the politics of humanitari-
anism, the article evolved to consider how the experience 
of one individual might suggest a broader phenomenon in 
how migration and policy were mutually constituted in the 
post-war period. The collaboration involving a series of con-
versations, fact-checks, and revisions (between September 
and November 2016) and presented an interesting meeting 
of academia, professional expertise, and a shared interest in 
better contextualizing the significance of Canada’s engage-
ment with the global refugee regime. 
Effecting Change
It was 1969, the year Canada signed the UN Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, that 
heralded a decade of change in Canada’s approach to the 
world’s refugees that included a more sustained and inno-
vative approach to refugee resettlement. To understand the 
significance of the bureaucratic interventions in these years, 
it is necessary to briefly consider the tenor and character of 
Canada’s response to refugees in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War. 
Responding to massive unemployment during the Great 
Depression and the demands of the Second World War, the 
federal government severely curtailed immigration for fif-
teen years. By the end of the war, Canada had only a tiny, 
enforcement-oriented immigration service situated in the 
Department of Mines and Resources.4 Little remained of the 
robust immigration program of the early twentieth century, 
which saw a million people arrive between 1911 and 1913. The 
government’s priority at the end of 1945 was to repatriate 
hundreds of thousands of Canadian servicemen and women 
and 50,000 “war brides.” Aside from 4,500 Polish war veter-
ans destined for Canadian farms after refusing to return to 
Communist Poland in 1946, few refugees were admitted. 
Although the federal government was generally disin-
terested in the plight of refugees in the immediate post-
war period, by 1947 resource-sector labour shortages were 
growing, and the government was pressured by employers 
and by religious and community leaders to reopen Euro-
pean immigration for refugees and war-separated families.5 
These pressures, and the government’s desire to play a role 
in the post-war international community, led to a decision 
to admit refugees from Europe. The creation of the Inter-
national Refugee Organization (IRO) to resolve the refugee 
problem provided the opportunity.6 Working with the IRO 
in occupied Germany and Austria and with the Canadian 
Christian Committee for Refugees in other parts of Europe, 
the Canadian Government Immigration Mission facilitated 
the admission of 163,000 displaced persons.7 
The federal government’s interest in displaced persons to 
address labour shortages coincided with developments on 
the international stage. On 8 August 1949, the UN’s Economic 
and Social Council adopted Resolution 248(IX) requesting 
the UN secretary-general to reconvene the Committee on 
Refugees and Stateless Persons. The committee, chaired by 
Canadian Leslie Chance, met from 16 January to 16 Febru-
ary 1950, and prepared the first draft of a refugee convention, 
which was revised and adopted within eighteen months.8 
Despite Canadian involvement, the government declined 
to ratify the convention. The RCMP and the Immigration 
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Department believed the convention would compromise the 
government’s ability to control admissions and interfere with 
deportations, even on national security grounds.9 Officials 
in External Affairs sought to overcome this opposition with-
out success until the 1960s.10
Ambivalence towards international refugee initiatives 
contributed to an approach that was far from cohesive. 
Refugees were not considered a permanent or pressing 
issue. In 1953, the Immigration Department optimistically 
announced that it would no longer report separate refugee 
statistics, assuming that refugees were a thing of the past.11 
That assumption was, of course, illusory. The 1956 Hungar-
ian uprising attracted strong media attention, and the pub-
lic demanded action on behalf of the “freedom fighters.”12 
The Liberal government hesitated: security advisers warned 
about Soviet infiltrators; Immigration officials doubted Hun-
garians could successfully adapt. The director of immigration 
warned against “non bona fide refugees,” whom he described 
as “members of the Hebrew race.”13 After dithering for a 
month, the government acted. Immigration Minister Jack 
Pickersgill flew to Vienna and personally directed an opera-
tion that set aside normal selection, security, and medical 
criteria and brought 37,000 Hungarian refugees to Canada. 
The Hungarian crisis set a precedent that was cited for dec-
ades: it established the notion in the minds of policymakers 
and the public that Canada could and would mount special, 
if ad hoc, resettlement operations when circumstances and 
public support dictated.14 
By the early 1960s the federal government concluded 
that the country’s race-based immigration policy no longer 
fit with how political leaders and elites saw Canada’s place 
in the world. Moreover, an immigration program shaped 
by racial preferences contradicted Conservative Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker’s Bill of Rights. Reform began 
when the minister of citizenship and immigration, Ellen 
Fairclough, brought in the 1962 immigration regulations 
that cancelled the most egregious regulations barring non-
European migrants (though significant barriers remained 
for family class migrants), and created migration opportu-
nities for those whose education, training, skills, or special 
qualifications made them likely to “successfully establish” 
in Canada.15 This was a critical step, but it was left largely 
to individual immigration officers to apply the policy on a 
case-by-case basis. There was substantial variance in how 
individual officers proceeded. 
Over the course of the post-war period, the sensibilities 
of Canada’s immigration service were fluctuated. As Harry 
Cunliffe, one of the veterans who joined the Immigration 
Department in 1947, described his contemporaries’ attitude, 
“We were among the first of our generation to appreciate the 
value of immigration to Canada. We developed a respect for 
our clientele … and because we had served abroad in World 
War II, we understood the hardships of travel, separation 
from family and of an uncertain future.”16 
In 1957 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration 
began professionalizing its overseas service through univer-
sity recruitment. This led to the selection of employees who 
often had a different sense of what constituted a desirable 
immigrant. As Molloy recalls, shortly after the 1962 regula-
tions came into place, the department undertook a campaign 
to recruit tool and die makers. At one of the smaller offices 
in the United Kingdom, a post-1957 recruit interviewed, 
accepted, and extended a transportation loan to a well-qual-
ified tool and die maker who happened to be Jamaican. The 
officer in charge (OIC) objected—the program was not for 
Jamaicans. The young officer demanded to know where that 
was stated in the regulations. The OIC had to admit it was not 
in the regulations, but “everyone knew” it was not for “col-
oured people.” The young officer stuck to his guns.17 As Mol-
loy explains, in the OIC’s defence, the 1962 changes, profound 
if incomplete, were made with no publicity, causing some 
officials to conclude that politicians were not serious and 
were counting on civil servants to maintain the status quo.18 
However, for the most part neither the veterans recruited 
after the war nor the university-educated officers recruited 
from 1957 onward had difficulty adapting to the new open 
policy. 
Even with the regulatory changes and new recruitment 
strategies, Canada’s immigration program continued to be 
critiqued. As the 1960s progressed, the lack of transparency 
in the immigration system gave rise to increasing accusa-
tions of arbitrariness and racism from scholars and the 
media. A precursor for substantial change was the official 
recognition that refugees were not just potential immigrants 
but, rather, were victims of persecution who should be con-
sidered in a class of their own. The first public indication of 
this transformation appeared in the widely circulated 1966 
white paper on immigration, which stated, “Because of the 
peculiar problems of refugees, and to permit the ordinary 
standards and procedures applicable to immigrants and 
non-immigrants to be set aside or relaxed on their behalf, 
it is proposed to introduce separate legislation to help refu-
gees. It is also intended that Canada should accede to the 1951 
International Convention on the Status of Refugees.”19
Further reform was clearly needed, and it fell to a former 
immigrant and journalist with a passion for equity, fair-
ness, and reform, Deputy Minister Tom Kent, to drive the 
change.20 The result was a point system, introduced 1967 
in an effort to achieve more consistency and objectivity in 
immigrant selection.21 With the concomitant expansion of 
the overseas immigration network, Canadian officials were 
soon applying identical criteria to applicants in 100 countries 
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under a “universal” immigration system. The reorganized 
and renamed Department of Manpower and Immigration 
became the instrument that facilitated rapid demographic 
change. According to Molloy, this was neither by accident 
nor design:
I do not believe that any of those, Kent included, who were associated 
with the changes really understood how quickly or how profoundly 
Canada would change. My 1968 class of trainees were briefed by 
officials who told us that Canada’s complexion was going to change 
from “white to brown.” I don’t think any of us quite believed it, even 
though we were being trained to go out into four corners of the 
world to recruit immigrants on the basis of the point system rather 
than race or colour. The government introduced a profound policy 
change, and the Immigration Department switched overnight from 
being the guardian of the all-white status quo, to facilitating the 
movement of immigrants from every continent. The new direction 
was quickly accepted.22 
As suggested in the white paper, Canada also moved to sign 
the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the associated protocol, which opened for signature in 1967. 
The 1967 Protocol removed both the temporal and geographic 
limitations to the Convention, making it globally applicable. 
Canada signed the Convention and Protocol in 1969. There 
was little if any public pressure to do so, and little fanfare when 
the decision to sign was announced. With External Affairs 
taking the lead, the impetus came mainly from within the 
government, driven by a sense that Canada, asserting lead-
ership within the UN, should at last ratify the international 
refugee instruments.23 With “universality” the new theme of 
Canada’s immigration policy as a result of further reforms in 
1967, opposition in the department evaporated. 
When the government created the Department of Man-
power and Immigration in 1966, it brought together the 
immigration program with elements from the Department 
of Labour and the National Employment Service. Created 
to achieve a closer alignment of immigration and labour 
market needs, the goals of the new department also included 
ensuring that:
• Canada discharges international obligations for the 
assistance of refugees.
• There is no discrimination by race, country or religion.
• Canada respects the interests of other countries as to 
the immigration of their citizens.24 
Injecting responsibility for refugees into the “DNA” of its 
new flagship department, the government assigned clear and 
formal responsibility for the refugee issue to the new minis-
ter of manpower and immigration and his deputy minister.
In signing the Convention and Protocol and creating 
departmental structures to facilitate refugee policies and 
programs, Canadian authorities were turning away from the 
previous ad hoc reaction to refugees. This reflected an over-
all trend to formalize and regulate the functioning of gov-
ernment, but the changes in the government’s approach to 
refugee policy were about more than regularizing policies.25 
They were also symbolic of the tone that Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau wanted to set for the country on the world 
stage.26 
Having signed the Convention and Protocol, the govern-
ment moved rapidly to consider the implications. On 27 July 
1970 Cabinet discussed a memorandum titled “Selection of 
Refugees for Resettlement in Canada” submitted by Minis-
ter Allen MacEachen. It began by stating a problem and an 
objective that demonstrated a desire to take Canada’s refugee 
programs in a new direction:
Problem: While Canada’s immigration policy was placed on a uni-
versal basis with the introduction of the new Immigration Regula-
tions in 1967 [point system], the selection of refugees has continued 
to favour persons of European origin.
Objective: The purpose of this memorandum is to establish a refu-
gee program which will admit refugees who have good prospects of 
settlement in Canada without regard to geographic origin.27
On the basis of the memorandum, Cabinet made three 
key decisions. First, it adopted the 1951 Convention’s refugee 
definition, as “universalized” by the Protocol, for resettle-
ment and protection: refugee selection would no longer be 
restricted to Europe. Second, the point system would be used 
to assess prospects for successful establishment, but Cabinet 
stressed that officers were expected to use their discretion-
ary authority to override the system in favour of refugees 
given the assistance available on arrival.28 Finally, Cabinet 
approved an Oppressed Minority policy that provided for 
the selection of oppressed people who were not Convention 
refugees because they were still in their home countries.
That Cabinet memorandum marked the emergence of 
a formal Canadian refugee policy. It was first step in what 
future minister of manpower and immigration Robert 
Andras, architect of the 1976 Immigration Act, would char-
acterize as “a discernible effort to envelope Canadian refu-
gee activity in a frame-work of policy and principle guide-
lines.”29 Cabinet’s decision was communicated to the staff of 
the Immigration Department in Operations Memorandum 
17 (OM17) of 2 January 1971, which laid out in considerable 
detail the implications of the Convention and the Protocol, 
and how refugee status determination and selection were to 
be implemented by Canadian officials abroad and by a new 
status determination committee in Canada.30 Molloy recalls 
amending his manual to add Ops Memo 17: “I was in Tokyo 
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when it came out, and it had little relevance to me, as we 
never saw refugees in Japan in those days. The Cabinet docu-
ment it was based on was shrouded in Cabinet secrecy, so we 
knew little about the background of the decision except that 
it related to signing the Convention.”31
The Oppressed Minority policy informed the Canadian 
response to refugees in Uganda, Chile, and Argentina. The 
Uganda operation was triggered by a British request for 
help when, on 4 August 1972, Ugandan President Idi Amin 
announced the expulsion of the country’s Asian minority. 
Prime Minister Trudeau declared that Canada would “offer 
an honourable place” to Ugandan Asians affected by the 
edict. The Uganda operation demonstrated the utility of the 
Oppressed Minority policy, as those ordered expelled were 
still in Uganda and therefore outside the UNHCR’s mandate. 
Molloy recalls,
When we arrived in Kampala, the UNHCR was not present. Our ini-
tial instructions issued by the Cabinet on August 22, 1972 were to 
select up to 3000 people who met ordinary immigration selection 
criteria. However, in response to team leader Roger St. Vincent’s 
daily reporting on what we were observing on the ground, six 
days after the operation started, Cabinet issued new instructions 
stressing the humanitarian nature of the operation and the need to 
focus on people with nowhere to go.32 When the Ugandan govern-
ment subsequently began stripping Asians of Ugandan citizenship, 
we were instructed to consider Asians with Ugandan passports as 
de facto stateless. It is unclear whether the government formally 
invoked the Oppressed Minority policy, but on the front line we 
were guided by it.33
Five thousand people were moved to Canada in two 
months.34 In 1973, now in coordination with UNHCR, Can-
ada accepted another 2,000 Asians from camps in Europe. 
According to Molloy, 
It was interesting to see how the policy evolved over the first few 
weeks of the operation … it was clear to my boss, Mr. St. Vincent, 
and myself that those in Ottawa had little understanding of what 
was evolving and they knew it. As the weeks rolled by, the tone of 
the communications became more and more concerned, even fran-
tic, about not leaving anyone behind. In the final weeks we were 
told we could take 300 “humanitarian cases” but it was a too late, 
and in any case we combed the applications repeatedly to identify 
those who were stateless and had accepted every disabled person 
and everyone in personal danger as they came through the door.35
In 1973, following the violent overthrow of the democrati-
cally elected regime of Salvador Allende in Chile, thousands 
of people were brutally targeted by the new regime. In 
Canada, church groups—many of which had been active 
in Latin America as part of the liberation theology move-
ment—lobbied the federal government to intervene on a 
scale at least akin to what had taken place in Uganda the 
previous year. Dogged by controversy from the start, the 
Chilean movement was politically difficult to manage and 
technically complex to deliver.36 The leaking of a sympa-
thetic assessment of the coup by the Canadian ambassador 
to Chile outraged churches and human rights advocates 
who coalesced into an assertive refugee advocacy commu-
nity. In the following years (and under continuous criticism), 
staff from the Department of Manpower and Immigration 
extracted distressed Chileans in three streams: Chilean Con-
vention refugees from neighbouring countries (referred by 
UNHCR), Chileans directly from Chile under the Oppressed 
Minority policy (often referred by the Catholic Vicaria de 
la Solidariedad), and 200 political prisoners (plus families) 
direct from Chile. A fourth stream of Chilean asylum seek-
ers arrived at Canadian airports providing work for a new 
interdepartmental committee in refugee status determina-
tion. As Molloy recalls, 
In the Chilean and Argentinian cases we had three tools we could 
use for those in different circumstances: the Convention definition 
for those who had fled persecution to neighbouring countries; the 
Oppressed Minority policy fit people hiding from the authorities in 
their own country; and the Political Prisoner Program, an offshoot 
of the Oppressed Minority policy, was for those incarcerated by 
the military regimes. I came on the scene in 1976, and there were 
still lots of problems—mainly to do with security screening—but 
providing guidance to the visa officers and dealing with the critics 
convinced me that we needed to be able design definitions to meet 
the characteristic of differing refugee problems rather than trying 
to cram them all into the Convention definition.37
The role of visa officers in interpreting and influencing 
policy would be critical again two years later when the fall 
of pro-Western governments in Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-
nam in 1975 precipitated the flight of hundreds of thousands 
of Indochinese migrants over land and sea. As the South 
Vietnamese regime crumbled, strict exit controls thwarted 
Canadian efforts to evacuate relatives of Vietnamese in 
Canada. At the initiative of Charles Roger, the manager of 
Manpower and Immigration’s office in Hong Kong, 3,500 
families were sent letters promising visas if they could reach 
a Canadian diplomatic facility. An American request led to 
a commitment to accept 3,000 Convention refugees from 
evacuation camps, first in Guam, then the United States and 
elsewhere. Nine thousand Indochinese refugees arrived in 
Canada over the next three years. The arrival of a notorious 
Vietnamese general in Montreal (to join his family) created a 
firestorm of criticism and killed political and public support 
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for Indochinese refugees.38 Molloy remembers, “When I 
took over the Refugee Policy Division in September 1976, the 
challenge was to sustain some kind of minimal involvement 
in the face of public indifference. This we did by focusing on 
relatives and squeezing every last number out of the com-
mitment to 3,000 Indochinese Convention refugees until the 
numbers started to build up in 1978. The indifference of the 
refugee lobby, deeply divided between pro–Eastern Euro-
pean and pro–Latin American groups, was disappointing.”39
The rapid succession of refugee problems—Uganda, Chile, 
and the first phase of Indochina, as well as a growing stream 
of people escaping communist Eastern Europe—demon-
strated to officials that refugee crises were no longer infre-
quent events. The Liberal government decided it was time 
to overhaul Canada’s outmoded immigration legislation. 
Robert Andras, a tough, competent minister, was given the 
mandate to make it happen. His deputy minister, Alan Got-
tlieb, and the official chosen to spearhead the project, Rich-
ard Tait, were talented thinkers from External Affairs whose 
experience at the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in 
Geneva had exposed them to refugee problems and the issue 
of Canada ratifying the Refugee Convention. 
Amongst all this talent, Kirk Bell stood out in this period 
of change, innovation, and purposeful engagement with the 
global refugee regime. Unpopular with the rank and file, Bell 
won the loyalty of those working most closely with him for 
his determination, strategic vision, and thoughtful approach 
to the department’s many critics. As Molloy recalls, “My first 
year with him was the hardest of my career, but his strategic 
vision of Canada’s refugee role, combined with my first-hand 
experience, was a good fit. At the time, he was director gen-
eral of recruitment and selection, and his mandate covered 
the entire range of issues relating to who should be able to 
come to Canada for permanent or temporary reasons, but 
refugees and Canada’s responsibilities for refugees globally 
were his passion. It was his vision that shaped the refugee 
policy and programs that emerged from the 1976 Immigra-
tion Act.”40 
Bell was determined to put Canada’s refugee effort on a 
firm legal and institutional footing. In 1975 he established 
a Refugee Policy Division (REFPOL) staffed by a director, a 
chief, and a secretary who would:
• lead implementation of the refugee provisions of the 
(1976) Immigration Act,
• generate options on emerging refugee issues,
• provide policy guidance to refugee operations,
• liaise with advocacy groups and communities,
• oversee the Interdepartmental Committee on Refu-
gee Status Determination, and
• spearhead the Immigration Department’s rela-
tions with implementation of the refugee pro, the 
Intergovernmental Committee on European Migra-
tion, and international humanitarian NGOs.41
During this time, units responsible for refugee matters 
were created in External Affairs and the Canadian Interna-
tional Development Agency, and an experienced immigra-
tion foreign service officer was assigned to the Canadian 
Mission in Geneva to coordinate Canadian relations with 
UNHCR. This proved to be a potent combination for engag-
ing international efforts on refugee issues. In its impact, the 
establishment of these refugee units was as important as the 
Cabinet decisions of 1970: there were now clusters of civil 
servants in three departments focusing exclusively on refu-
gee issues.
REFPOL’s work was undertaken within the framework of 
the 1976 Immigration Act, which came into force in 1978. 
The drafting of the Act was preceded by wide public consul-
tations. Hundreds of submissions were received and a joint 
parliamentary committee held public hearings across the 
country. The refugee advocacy community took full advan-
tage of the consultative process to make known their views 
on asylum and resettlement. As Molloy recalls, “On asylum, 
they wanted a system that allowed the asylum seeker to put 
his or her case directly to the relevant decision-maker, some-
thing the government of the day considered to be too costly. 
On resettlement they wanted a transparent law-based system 
and meaningful way to influence the government’s priori-
ties. On private sponsorship, which we were testing with a 
couple of pilot projects, some of more influential advocates 
were opposed, but grassroots consultations from Halifax to 
Vancouver revealed real interest.”42
The 1976 Immigration Act contained a large number of 
refugee provisions. The Convention definition, adopted by 
Cabinet in 1970, was embedded in section 2(1) and among the 
objectives of Canada’s immigration policy was the following:
3.g to fulfill Canada’s international legal obligations to refugees and 
to uphold its humanitarian traditions with respect to the displaced 
and the persecuted.43
Section 4(2)(b) set the parameters under which a Con-
vention refugee could remain in Canada, while section 6(2) 
established the framework for the selection of Convention 
refugees from abroad, along with what became known as 
designated classes. It also established the regulatory basis for 
private sponsorship of refugees and designated classes.44
Consultations with the Standing Conference of Organi-
zations Concerned with Refugees (predecessor of the Cana-
dian Council for Refugees) led to a decision to drop the point 
system per se from the overseas refugee selection system. 
The officials designing the new resettlement system were 
constrained by section 6(1) of the Act requiring that refugees, 
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like other immigrants, “be able to become successfully estab-
lished in Canada.” The new rules instructed visa officers to 
consider the “norms of assessment” (age, education, occupa-
tion, presence in Canada of relatives or sponsors, English or 
French competency, etc.) without assigning points, and to 
consider public and private assistance available to refugees 
on arrival. While it did not meet all the advocates’ wishes, 
the system proved highly elastic in accommodating a broad 
spectrum of refugees in the succeeding decades.
The cornerstone of the new resettlement system, the Con-
vention Refugee in Need of Resettlement Class rested on a 
three-stage process. The first was eligibility, i.e., compliance 
with the Convention definition. The second, admissibility, 
the potential for successful establishment. And finally statu-
tory requirements—medical and security/criminality crite-
ria. Critically, given the limitations of the Convention refu-
gee definition, REFPOL staff seized the opportunity offered 
by section 6(2) of the Act to create alternative humanitar-
ian designated classes, “the admission of which would be 
in accordance with Canada’s humanitarian tradition with 
respect to the displaced and persecuted.”45 The thinking 
behind the three designated class provides a good example 
of how operational experience and policy objectives inter-
acted during this time. 
Ironically, while the Convention definition had be 
designed for people fleeing persecution in the East European 
community bloc, many of those presenting themselves for 
resettlement at Canadian embassies in Rome and Vienna 
by the 1970s had either been given permission by the com-
munist regimes to depart for Israel or to travel for business 
or cultural purposes in Western Europe. There were pow-
erful community interests supporting their resettlement in 
Canada, but in many cases the Convention definition did 
not fit the circumstances, not least because many objected 
to being classified as refugees.46 As a result, Molloy asked 
Raphael Girard, then manager of the visa office in Rome, to 
draft a designated class regulation to more precisely fit the 
circumstances of the East Europeans his staff were seeing. 
The resulting Self-Exiled Persons Designated Class shifted 
the focus from persecution to the reality that these people 
were being systematically stripped of the citizenship by their 
countries of origin.47 Girard’s draft regulation provided that 
the “self-exiled” be treated as Convention refugees in need 
of resettlement in all other regards, including eligibility for 
private sponsorship. It became the template for design of the 
other designated classes, remaining in effect until the Soviet 
Union collapsed.
Because the Oppressed Minority policy created by Cabi-
net in 1970 had proved to be such a useful tool in Uganda 
and Latin America, the Convention definition minus the 
requirement to be outside one’s country became the core of 
the Political Prisoner and Oppressed Persons Designated 
Class (PPOP). The Indochinese Designated Class sidestepped 
the issue of individualized persecution because of the bru-
tal protection calculus in Southeast Asia. Whatever their 
motivation for fleeing, if large numbers of boat people were 
not resettled rapidly, the Southeast Asian asylum countries 
would close their shores and people would die. 
With the designated classes the government settled the 
question of eligibility and signalled its objectives to the 
frontline officers with great clarity. It was left to officials to 
assess admissibility. In case of the Self-Exiled Designated 
Class, the interests of Canada’s Eastern European and Jewish 
communities and their record in settling their compatriots 
or co-religionist, along with Canada’s Cold War stance, were 
critical. For the PPOP Class it was the proven utility of a 
policy that permitted intervention for people facing oppres-
sion but unable to flee across borders. With the Indochinese 
Designated Class, the need to move people quickly to save 
lives and a conviction that the situation in Southeast Asia 
was about to become much worse, were critical. Field-based 
operational experience helped shape the regulatory frame-
work governing refugee admissions to Canada. This in turn 
supported the government’s efforts to further formalize the 
overall structure of the country’s immigration and refugee 
programs.
The 1976 Immigration Act required the government to 
consult widely about immigration intake and announce 
each year’s immigration “levels” in advance. The traditional 
view, that it was futile to plan refugee intake from year to 
year because new refugee crises were impossible to foresee, 
was obsolete. The Department of Manpower and Immigra-
tion was concurrently running multi-year resettlement pro-
grams in South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia and 
was beginning to ponder expanding into Africa.48 It was 
therefore proposed by Molloy and Ian Timonin, who was in 
charge of levels planning, that the department should seek 
Cabinet approval for those continuing programs once a year, 
rather than piecemeal, and to deal with unexpected crises as 
they arose. This led to the insertion of an Annual Refugee 
Plan into the Annual Immigration Levels Plan. The planning 
process would include consultations with provincial govern-
ments, churches, and NGOs, anchored by input from UNHCR.
The first Annual Refugee Plan, submitted to Cabinet in 
December 1978, came hard on the heels of Minister Bud Cul-
len’s intervention on behalf of Indochinese refugees stranded 
on the derelict freighter the Hai Hong in November 1978, 
and a consultation on the emerging Indochinese refugee cri-
sis hosted by UNHCR in Geneva in early December.49 On 21 
December 1978 Cabinet reviewed two documents.50 The first 
focused on the situation in Southeast Asia and recommended 
Canada accept 5,000 Indochinese refugees in 1979. Cabinet 
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agreed. The second document sought Cabinet’s endorsement 
of “the concept of an annual program for refugee resettlement, 
to be presented to Cabinet in conjunction with the annual 
immigration levels exercise.”51 The document presented a 
rationale for the resettlement program. The premise of Cana-
da’s resettlement strategy was that “the strategy of our refugee 
program with respect to overseas selection is based on the 
premise that in a refugee producing situation there will always 
be more refugees in need of resettlement than we will be able 
to accept. Therefore, the objective of our strategy is to accept 
those in greatest need of our assistance who, at the same time, 
can successfully establish in Canada.”52
Criteria for evaluating the appropriateness of resettlement 
in emerging refugee situations included:
1. The situation has been examined by the Government of Canada, 
the UNHCR and the World Community and it is generally agreed 
that
a. there is a high level of need and
b. resettlement in countries such as Canada is both feasible and 
desirable in terms of hastening a complete solution and from 
the point of view of the individual well-being of refugees.
2. The situation is one where Canada for geographical or historical 
reasons can be considered as having responsibilities as a first 
line country of resettlement, e.g., Geographical—Western 
Europe, Historical—Eastern Europe.
3. The situation is of such seriousness that a general public consen-
sus develops that Canada must make a contribution.
4. The situation is of serious concern to a segment of the Canadian 
community that is interested in Canada’s international humani-
tarian role or in the well-being of a particular group abroad.53
The strategy and criteria took into account international 
assessments of refugee crises confronting the global refugee 
regime and the interests of the Canadian public. The UNHCR 
was at the centre of Canada’s resettlement strategy. The 
memorandum to cabinet declared,
It is our policy to consult with the UNHCR in identifying those 
among the refugee population who could most benefit from our 
help. This consultation is carried out at three levels:
i. With senior officials in Geneva as part of our role as a 
member of the UNHCR executive committee.
ii. With UNHCR field staff where problems exist or may 
occur in assessing the gravity of the situation and in 
identifying cases that will benefit from resettlement in 
Canada.
iii. With UNHCR representatives in Canada in discussing 
policy options and their operation implications.54
The document affirmed the policy to go beyond the 
Convention definition when selecting refugees (the new 
designated class provisions) and to provide maximum flex-
ibility to officers selecting refugees (exemption from the 
point system). The new sponsorship system “will allow us to 
select refugees who could not otherwise be considered capa-
ble of successful establishment.”55 The government endorsed 
the Annual Refugee Plan for fiscal year 1979/80. Refugee 
resettlement was now embedded in the federal budgetary 
cycle. As Molloy explains the significance of this initiative,
The agreement to include a refugee plan in the Annual Levels plan-
ning cycle meant that henceforth, whether there was a new crisis 
or not, the government of the day would review and determine 
Canada’s resettlement activities for the coming year and trigger the 
necessary funding. Provincial governments and the settlement and 
advocacy communities had to be consulted, and the plan had to 
take account of UNHCR’s priorities. That meant the UNHCR itself had 
to develop priorities. In 1981 I was assigned to the Canadian Mis-
sion to the UN in Geneva, where an important part of the work was 
to engage UNHCR and missions of the other resettlement countries 
in thinking about where and how resettlement activities could best 
be deployed: small steps toward the elaborate systems of resettle-
ment consultations in place today.56
In the same historic month, December 1978, the Indo-
chinese Designated Class Regulations became law, and the 
Mennonite Church decided to seek an agreement with the 
Immigration Department permitting the Mennonite Cen-
tral Committee to authorize its congregations to sponsor 
refugees. A “Master Agreement” was signed by April; agree-
ments with other churches quickly followed. 
The elements of a sustainable, flexible, law-based resettle-
ment program linking domestic interest and international 
priorities were now in place. It would be tested shortly in 
Southeast Asia, and 60,000 refugees would come to Canada 
as a result.
Conclusion
The people responsible for delivering immigration and refugee 
policy had a profound impact on how refugee policy evolved 
in Canada. A succession of resettlement programs (Uganda, 
Chile, and Indochina 1975–6) created operational expertise 
and competence, intensified interaction with UNHCR, and led 
to purposeful interdepartmental coordination. The refugee 
elements of the 1976 Immigration Act emerged from the pol-
icy and operational experience gained following ratification 
of the Convention and Protocol and the application of the 
Oppressed Minority policy. Experience gained with alterna-
tive definitions, selection criteria, status determination, and 
sponsorship was mined in designing the Act. 
In the period from 1970 to 1978, civil servants, work-
ing within the framework established by Cabinet, drove 
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innovation: being required to transform and think more 
seriously about refugee issues was now part of the depart-
ment’s ongoing business. This included the rapid succession 
of disparate and far-flung refugee crises, the new challenge 
of dealing with asylum seekers on Canadian soil, a recogni-
tion that refugee reform at home positioned Canada to lead 
at the international level, and the emergence of a forceful 
advocacy community. The advocates certainly made them-
selves heard, and in the words of Kirk Bell, often “pushed us 
in the direction we wished to go.”57 However, the experience 
gained and the considerable freedom to interpret the poli-
cies developed in Ottawa were critical contributing factors 
in the evolution of Canada’s refugee program from an ad hoc 
affair into an enduring framework for refugee admissions 
and resettlement. 
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